

Message Text

SECRET

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73

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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Z 100030Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5562
USMISSION GENEVA FLASH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 6404

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM MACOMBER

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS PFOR, CY, TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GENEVA II NEGOTIATIONS

AT PRIMINISTER'S REQUEST I MET WITH HIM AND
DEFENSE MINISTER ISIK BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND ONE A.M. MORNING OF
AUGUST 10TH.

PRIMINISTER HAD A FEW MINUTES EARLIER SPOKEN WITH GUNES BY
PHONE WHO HAD REPORTED ON HIS RECENTLY COMPLETED CONVERSATION WITH
CALLAGHAN. BOTH THE PRIMINISTER AND GUNES WERE DEEPLY TROUBLED BY
FACT THAT CALLAGHAN WAS APPARENTLY CONSIDERING REFERRING THE WHOLE
MATTER TO THE TWO COMMUNITY LEADERS WHILE THE OTHER POWERS CON-
CERNED WOULD BE RELEGATED TO THE SIDELINES "FOR A MONTH OR SO".
THIS, SAID ECEVIT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO REVIVING THE INTER-COMMUNAL
TALKS, A SUGGESTION CLERIDES HAD MADE TO DENKTASH SOON AFTER BE-
COMING PRESIDENT, AND DENKTASH HAD PROMPTLY AND PROPERLY REJECTED
IT AS REPRESENTING A RETURN TO AN OLD SYSTEM AND OLD
METHODS WHICH SIMPLY HAD NOT WORKED.

SUCH A DEVICE HIGHLY LIKELY TO ALLOW AN UNSETTLED SITUATION TO
DRAG ON AND A DETERIORATING SITUATION ON THE ISLAND ("MORE CLASHES,
MORE PROBLEMS") WOULD BE THE INEVITABLE RESULT. BEFORE LONG THIS
WOULD LEAD TO INTRODUCTION OF MORE GREEK AND TURKISH TROOPS ON THE
ISLAND AND FINALLY TO MAJOR RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES, THIS TIME IN-

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VOLVING GREEKS AND TURKS DIRECTLY.

PRIMIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND SHARED, US VIEW THAT KARAMANLIS GOVT NOT BE HUMILIATED - A POINT, HE NOTED, THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD MADE AGAIN IN HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KORUTURK. HE THEN REPEATED THE VIEW WITH WHICH YOU ARE NOW FAMILIAR, NAMELY, THAT IF KARAMANLIS WOULD AGREE TO A SOLUTION PROMPTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY WOULD FALL ON HIS PREDECESSORS. HOWEVER, IF HE DELAYED A MONTH OR TWO THE RESPONSIBILITY WOULD ACCRUE TO HIM.

HE SAID ANOTHER REASON THAT DELAY WAS UNWISE WAS THAT THE ALMOST INEVITABLE BREACHES IN THE CEASE-FIRE (WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD COME FROM BOTH SIDES) WOULD PROVIDE CONTINUING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE ISSUE AND TO KEEP RUNNING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

TIME, HE SAID, HAD PROVED TURKISH ANXIETIES RIGHT, THAT MANY MAJOR PROVISIONS OF GENEVA I AGREEMENT WOULD PROVE INAPPLICABLE WITHOUT A BASIC SOLUTION HAVING BEEN REACHED. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, AS FAR AS TURK GOVT COULD TELL, NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE WITH RESPECT TO EVACUATING TURKISH ENCLAVES WHICH HAD BEEN OVERRUN, AND NONE HAD BEEN ABOE TO ORGANIZE THEIR OWN SECURITY "EXCEPT PERHAPS IN FAMAGUSTA."

RETURNING TO THE THEME OF NOT HUMILIATING THE GREEKS HE SAID THAT A "STAGING" COULD BE DESIGNED TO PREVENT THIS. FOR EXAMPLE GREEKS COULD ACCEPT TURK PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION AND AUTONOMY FROM THE START (WHICH WOULD BE FAR LESS HUMILIATING THAN OPPOSING THEM AT THE START AND LATER HAVING TO ACCEPT THEM). ONCE PRINCIPLES WERE ACCEPTED, HE ADDED, PRESSURE FOR IMMEDIATE DECISIONS COULD BE LESSENED AND DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT OVER MUCH LONGER TIME PERIOD.

AT THIS POINT HE SAID THAT CALLAGHAN'S IDEA OF HAVING THE SOLUTION EMERGE AS ONE FASHIONED BY CLERIDES AND DENKTASH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE TURKS BUT ONLY IF IT EMERGED AT ONCE. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO SET DEADLINES BUT IT ESSENTIAL THAT I STRESS TO YOU HIS CONVICTION THAT THE BASIC INGREDIENTS OF A SOLUTION MUST REPEAT MUST EMERGE WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND HE AGAIN REPEATED THAT ONCE BASIC TURKISH PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN ACCEPTED DETAILED APPLICATIONS COULD BE WORKED

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OUT CONSIDERABLY LATER.

HE SAID THE RUSSIANS WERE OBVIOUSLY SEEKING TO EXPLOIT SITUATION AT EXPENSE OF BOTH U.S. AND THE TURKS BUT HE FELT THAT ON ONE SCORE THEY HAD A GENUINE CONCERN, NAMELY, THAT TURK SOLUUTION WILL END UP IN PARTITION. HE SAID HE WAS DISPATCHING A SENIOR DIPLOMAT (ISMAYL SOYSUL) TO MOSCOW WITH AN ORAL MESSAGE TRYING TO ALLAY THIS SOVIET ANXIETY AND HE SAID HE WANTED

ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT GOT WOULD AGREE TO "FULL GUARANTEES" AGAINST PARTITION AND DOUBLE ENOSIS (I MIGHT HAVE NOTICED, HE SAID, THAT NO ONE IN TURKEY NOW TALKED OF PARTITION, "EVEN MY COALITION PARTNER, MR. ERBEKAN".) TURKS UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS THESE CONCEPTS CAUSE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. MOVEOVER, HE ADDED, "WE DONT WANT PART OF GREECE AS OUR SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR."

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 6404

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM MACOMBER

COMING TO HIS BASIC REQUEST, PRIMIN SAID THAT HE AND GIINES HAD CONCLUDED THAT CALLAGHAN WAS NOT GOING TO BACK THEIR POSITION, "ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT SAID THAT", NEVERTHELESS THEY FELT HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF IN A "DIFFICULT POSITON" IN THAT CYPRUS WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THAT THEY HAD SOVEREIGN BASES THERE. IN ANY EVENT THEY DID NOT THINK BRITISH WOULD "PUT FRIENDLY WEIGHT BEHIND "THE TURKISH POSITION" WHEN IT WAS TABLED IN GENEVA LATER THIS MORNING.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, PRIMIN SAID, A TIMELY AND HELPFUL "CONTRIBUTION" BY YOU WAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT AND URGENTLY REQUESTED.

PRIMIN ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE SUMMONED ME IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT OR ADDED TO YOUR BURDENS AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME IF HE WERE NOT SO DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE APPARENT TURN EVENTS WERE ABOUT TO TAKE IN GENEVA.

IN RESPONSE I MADE OF FOLLOWING BASIC POINTS. FIRST, I SAID THAT I DID NOT SEE HOW YOU COULD BE HELPFUL TO THE TURKS IF THEIR

POSITION IN GENEVA CONSISTED OF A SERIES OF NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMANDS, THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THEY WOULD STICK ON AND WHAT THEY WOULD NOT. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN US, ECEVIT RESPONDED TO THIS POINT AS FOLLOWS:

1) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES BEING BROKEN DOWN

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INTO TWO GEOGRAPHICALLY DELINEATED AREAS WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE. THE TURKISH AREA SHOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT - BUT THAT WAS NEGOTIABLE, AND SO WERE WHERE THE LINES DELINEATING THESE COMMUNITIES

WOULD SPECIFICALLY RUN.

2) WITHIN THESE GEOGRAPHICALLY DELINEATED COMMUNITIES THERE MUST BE COMPLETE LOCAL AUTOMONY, AND THIS IS NON-NEGOTIABLE.

3) THE TWO COMMUNITIES MUST BE JOINED TOGETHER TO CONSTITUTE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE - THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE BEING NON-NEGOTIABLE, BUT THE DESIGN OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS TOTALLY NEGOTIABLE.

NEXT I SAID THAT I DID NOT SEE HOW YOU COULD BE HELPFUL UNLESS THESE THE TURK CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS CEASED ONCE AND FOR ALL. I ADDED THAT I TOTALLY FAILED TO UNDERSTAND IN THIS CONNECTION, WHY TURKEY RISKED SUCH ADVERSE WORLD WIDE CONSEQUENCES FOR SUCH MINOR GAINS. I SAID THAT IF YOU WERE SITTING AS I WAS WITH THE PRIMIN I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD INSIST ON A FLAT ASSURANCE THAT THIS MUST STOP. PRIMIN RESPONDED THAT HE HAD HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH I S I K FOLLOWING MY DEMARCHE TO ISIK LAST NIGHT, THAT HE AGREED WITH THE US VIEW AND THAT I SHOULD TELL SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT "WHILE IT IS VERY HARD, I AM DOING EVERYTHING I CAN TO BRING THIS TO A FULL HALT." I SAID "CAN I ASSURE SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT IT WILL HALT COMPLETELY." HE SAID, "I WILL DO MY BEST."

FINALLY I REFERRED TO THE MAXIMUM ALERT AT INCIRLIK AND MURTED AIR BASES AND SAID THIS HAD NATURALLY CAUSED ME CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS. BOTH PRIMIN AND ISIK SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW THE SPECIFIC REASON FOR THIS MAXIMUM ALERT BUT THEY COULD ABSOLUTELY ASSURE ME THAT IT WAS IN NO WAY CONNECTED WITH ANY EFFORT TO ESCALATE THE CYPRUS SITUATION. PRIMIN SAID FLATLY THAT BEFORE THE GOT WOULD TAKE SUCH A STEP IT WOULD BE IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH US.

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